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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the federal estate tax has garnered a great deal of attention
from lawmakers, the media, and the general public.' Dubbed the "death tax,"
the federal estate tax is levied upon estates that exceed a certain value.2 The
estate tax has been attacked as being immoral and unfair by opponents.3 Sup-
porters of the estate tax have argued that it is essential in the preservation of
democracy.4 Regarding this debate, one commentator has said:
Never in the course of human taxation has so much furor been generated by so many
about a tax that affects so few. While only 2 percent of estates in this country are
taxed and account for slightly more than 1 percent of all federal revenues, tempers
over the estate tax continue to flare in a strange combustion of moral indignation and
economic erudition.
5
Essentially, the estate tax debate has become one of inherent freedoms,
societal obligations, and fundamental fairness.
The federal estate tax finds its constitutional basis in Article I, Section 8 of
the United States Constitution, which reads, "The Congress shall have Power
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."6
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l Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Estate Tax Repeal: Through the Looking
Glass, 22 VA. TAX REV. 187, 188 (2002).
2 Estate tax is levied only on the portion of the estate that exceeds the unified credit. In
2005, the amount of the credit was $1,500,000. From 2006 through 2008, the amount of the
credit will be $2,000,000. In 2009, the credit will be raised to $3,500,000. I.R.C. § 2010.
(2004).
1 Burke & McCouch, supra note 1, at 188.
4 See James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001)
(concluding that the estate tax works to further democracy by decreasing the concentration
of dynastic wealth and raising revenue).
I Jim Grote, The Estate of the Union, PLANNED GIVING TODAY, April 2001, at 1, available
at http://pgtoday.com/pgt/articles/the-estate_f-the-union.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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With this clause, the Founders granted the United States Congress power to
impose taxes on the citizenry of the United States, with very few limitations.7
Although many have tried to attack the constitutionality of the federal
estate tax on the basis of unequal treatment, this argument has repeatedly
failed.8 In upholding the constitutionality of the estate tax in 1921, writing for
the court Justice Holmes said:
[The] matter ... is disposed of . not by an attempt to make some scientific
distinction, which would be at least difficult, but on an interpretation of language by
its traditional use-on the practical and historical ground that this kind of tax always
has been regarded as the antithesis of a direct tax .... Upon this point a page of
history is worth a volume of logic.9
What history has to show us with regard to the estate tax will be an
increasingly important topic in upcoming years as Congress continues to debate
the estate tax. The purpose of this Note is not to debate the constitutionality of
the federal estate tax, but rather to examine how our Founding Fathers would
view the modem estate tax, and how the modern estate tax works to further the
founding vision. In 1789, Benjamin Franklin was quoted as saying, "In this
world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes."' 0 The ques-
tion that this Note examines is whether Franklin, and other members of the
Founding Generation, would advocate these two certainties of life coinciding at
the same moment in time.
In order to discern whether the Founders would support the modern for-
mulation of the estate tax, this Note first examines the purpose and history
behind the federal estate tax. Although much debate regarding the estate tax
revolves around its use as a way to level inherited wealth, the estate tax has
historically been a revenue-generating device.' In addition, historical death
taxes were used only during times of exigency and war. 2 The modern estate
tax was originally enacted in 1916 to raise revenue for World War .13 How-
ever, unlike previous taxes, the estate tax was not repealed at the conclusion of
World War I, and today continues to exist in largely the same form. 4
A close analysis of the federal estate tax provides evidence that the Foun-
ders did not foresee the use of a federal estate tax as a permanent means by
which to generate everyday revenue. Instead, the Founders apparently intended
to primarily use taxes upon commerce to fund the federal government, while
7 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540 (1869).
8 See, e.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 109 (1900); New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U.S. 345, 348 (1921); and Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927).
9 New York Trust Co., 256 U.S. at 349 (emphasis added).
'0 JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 310 (16th ed., 1992).
" See Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223
(1956).
12 For a full discussion on the role of the estate tax as a way to generate revenue in times of
war, see Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 224-31.
13 Id. at 230.
" See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CoNG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELAT-
ING TO ESTATE AND GiFr TAXES PART I.B. (Comm. Print 1998).
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state governments could employ other modes of taxation. ' 5 Early federal death
taxes generally excluded the real property from the tax base,' 6 lending credibil-
ity to the opinion that the Forefathers did not envision real property as being a
proper subject for federal death taxation. As a final point, evidence supports
the idea that the Founders intended the nation to be supported by a system of
proportional taxation. 17 In contrast to this, the federal estate tax serves as a
progressive centerpiece in the modem federal taxation system.' 8
Because the federal estate tax varies from founding views in at least three
important ways-the intended use of federal death taxation, the inclusion of
real property, and progressivity versus proportionality-this Note concludes
that the modem use of the federal estate tax is inconsistent with the vision of
the Founding Generation.
II. PURPOSE OF THE ESTATE TAX
What is the purpose of the modern estate tax? This question is one of the
most essential in determining whether the tax fits within the founding vision.
The estate tax works to both raise revenue and to limit the amount of inherited
wealth that can be passed from generation to generation.' 9 However, a dispro-
portionate amount of the public debate seems to focus on the social aspect of
the tax, with many going so far as to say that the tax could be abolished with no
discernible effect on revenue since its annual yield is so low.2 °
Historically, the tax was used as a way to finance war,2 1 making its histor-
ical purpose one of revenue generation. To what degree the estate tax contin-
ues to serve as a means by which to raise revenue is an on-going topic of
debate. In 2004, the federal estate tax generated $24 billion in revenue.22
While this is by no means a small sum of money, it accounted for only 1% of
total 2004 federal revenues.23 Because the estate tax raises such a small
amount with respect to total federal revenue, commentators have largely dis-
missed its revenue-generating role.2 4 Yet, despite this relatively low yield,
" James Madison, Letter 1: Madison on the Tariff, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 600, 605 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 4 DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS].
16 Only the 1864 amendments to the Civil War inheritance tax provided for the inclusion of
real property. Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 127-147, 13 Stat. 223, 287-91 (1864) [here-
inafter Act of 1864].
17 See infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text.
18 RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 714 (1954).
'9 Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 572 (2003).
20 See Joel C. Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1215 (1984) (arguing that the estate tax should be repealed because it produces negligible
revenue); Charles 0. Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 TAx NOTES 1413
(1991) (suggesting revenues lost from estate tax repeal could be made up through changes to
the income tax).
21 Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 224-31.
22 Carolyn Lochhead, House OKs repeal of estate tax-fate in Senate uncertain, SAN FRAN-
CISCO CHRON., Apr. 14, 2005, at A-5.
23 Id.
24 Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The Matthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993,
1050 (2004) (arguing that that revenue generation is a secondary purpose of the estate tax).
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many legal scholars agree that that the purpose of the estate tax continues to be
the generation of revenue.25
Most public estate tax debate has focused on the social policy aspect of the
tax.16 Beginning in the late 1800s, Americans began to protest the accumula-
tion of American fortunes. 27 Among the public, a tax upon inherited wealth
was an appealing option for fighting against growing American fortunes. 28 A
tax on inheritances was publicly advocated for by Professor Seligman and his
former student, Dr. Max West, in 1893 and 1894 as a way to redistribute
wealth.29 By the early 1900s, Theodore Roosevelt was pushing for an inheri-
tance tax as a means by which to level inherited wealth.3° Campaigning for an
inheritance tax before Congress in 1907, Roosevelt said:
Our aim is to recognize what Lincoln pointed out-to insist that there should be an
equality of right before the law, and at least an approximate equality in the conditions
under which each man obtains the chance to show the stuff that is in him when
compared to his fellows.
3 1
While the 1916 estate tax was enacted to raise revenue for World War 1,32
many have speculated that the failure to repeal it at the conclusion of the war,
and the estate tax's persistence today, can be attributed to the social objective
of the tax.3 3
In 1955, Louis Eisenstein explained the preoccupation with social role of
the estate tax in writing:
I suspect that a good deal of the emphasis on the social objective of the tax, as
distinguished from its fiscal objective, is skillfully contrived to keep its yield as low
as possible. The reasoning is simple. Why collect more revenue through the estate
tax if the tax is not really expected to raise revenue in the first place?
34
Although the social role of the estate tax is recognized, this Note will
focus on the tax as a revenue generating mechanism, the role that it plays in a
progressive tax system, and whether it is within the founding vision to raise
federal revenues through the taxation of estates.
25 Alana J. Darnell, Comment: Toward an Integrated Treatment of Gifts and Inheritances,
34 SETON HALL L. REv 671, 683 (2004) (citing James R. Repetti, The Case for the Estate
and Gift Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 1493 (2000)); see also Eisenstein, supra note 11.
26 Owen Ullmann, New Wealth Will Make 'Death Tax' Hit Home, USA TODAY, Jan. 25,
2000, at IA (stating that the estate tax generally lacks public support because (1) it is not
believed that death, alone, should trigger a tax, and (2) the tax results in the breakdown of
family farms and businesses).
27 The wartime economy brought about by the Civil War resulted in the accumulation of
large American fortunes during the 1860s and 1870s. These fortunes persisted through the
economic downturn of the 1880s, resulting in public condemnation of the large fortunes,
which continued to flourish. See KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RICH 3-47 (2002).
28 Barry W. Johnson & Martha Britton Eller, Federal Taxation of Inheritance and Wealth
Transfers, in INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 61, 64 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Ste-
phen J. McNamee eds., 1998).
29 PAUL, supra note 18, at 66.
30 Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 228.
31 Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Message (Dec. 3, 1907), http://www.theodore-
roosevelt.com/sotu7.html.
32 Darnell, supra note 25, at 678.
33 Id. at 681.
3 Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 225.
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III. HISTORY OF THE ESTATE TAX
Throughout U.S. history, inheritance taxes came and went on three differ-
ent occasions before an estate tax was permanently enacted in 1916. 3" In each
of these instances, inheritance taxes were levied to raise wartime revenue, and
were repealed at the end of conflict.36 The 1916 tax was initially enacted to
raise revenue for World War I, but at the end of the war the tax was not
repealed as it had been on previous occasions.37
A. Revenues to Raise a Navy
The first U.S. death tax was enacted in 1797 in the form of a stamp duty,38
although death taxes had been proposed in 1794"9 and 1796.40 The Revenue
Act of 179741 was enacted to raise revenue for the raising of a Navy.42 In
pertinent part, the statute provided that stamp duties would be levied on:
any receipt or other discharge for or on account of any legacy left by any will or
other testamentary instrument, or for any share or part of a personal estate divided by
force of any statute of distributions, the amount whereof shall be above the value of
fifty dollars, and shall not exceed the value of one hundred dollars, twenty-five cents;
where the amount thereof shall exceed the value of one hundred dollars and shall not
exceed five hundred dollars, fifty cents; and for every further sum of five hundred
dollars, the additional sum of one dollar.
43
35 Id. at 224-230.
36 Id.
3' Damell, supra note 25, at 678-80.
38 Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 527.
39 On April 17, 1794, Alexander Hamilton brought the proposal of the Special Committee
on Finance before Congress and recommended a duty on "[r]eceipts for legacies, or shares of
personal estate, in cases of intestates." 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 277 (Walter Lowrie &
Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds., William S. Hein & Co 1998) (1832). Proposed duties were
25¢ for legacies between $50 and $100, 50¢ on legacies between $100 and $500, and $1 on
each additional $500. The proposal was not to extend to "wives, children or grand-chil-
dren." Id. This proposal was a stamp duty imposed on the recipients of legacies and intes-
tate shares, and is essentially, what Congress later enacted in 1797. Compare id., with Act
of July 6, 1797, 1 Stat. 527.
40 In 1796, a duty on inheritances was again proposed. 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 39, at 409. William Smith, speaking for the Ways and Means Committee, proposed
"[t]hat a duty of two per centum [in proportion to the product's value] ought to be imposed
on all testamentary dispositions, descents, and successions to the estates of intestates, except-
ing those to parents, husbands, wives, or lineal descendants." Id. The duty was "to be
imposed on all testamentary dispositions," indicating that the intent may have been to
impose the duty before it was given to heirs. Id. While this language is not clear, it appears
that the Ways and Means Committee intended to impose a two percent duty on estate shares
before they passed to beneficiaries. If this was the intent behind the 1796 proposal, this
proposal would be closer in structure to the 1916 estate tax than to the flat-rate, 1794 propo-
sal. Like the 1794 proposal, the 1796 proposal was not adopted by Congress. Id.
41 Id.
42 Johnson & Eller, supra note 28, at 64.
13 Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 527 (1797). Compared to modem rates, the rates
enacted in 1797 were very modest. A straight comparison of the 1797 inheritance duty and
the modem estate tax cannot be made because of the structural differences between the two
taxes. However, simple math shows that the rate imposed by the 1797 duty would have
ranged from 0.25% to 0.5% on the amount of an estate between $100 and $500, and could
have been as low as 0.05% on every $500 of value thereafter. This is in comparison to
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The inheritance duty of 1797 was repealed in 1802 after there was no
longer an urgent need for revenues."4
B. Civil War Death Tax
Death taxes did not reappear in the United States until the advent of the
Civil War.4 5 On December 9, 1861, Secretary of the Treasury Chase proposed
a graduated legacy and succession tax that would apply to both direct and col-
lateral heirs.46 An inheritance tax was applauded as a way to generate revenue
while inciting little public criticism.47
Under the 1862 Act, a stamp duty was levied on letters of probate or
administration, with the amount of the duty increasing according to the value of
the property to be disposed.4" This duty was levied in addition to duties on a
variety of other things.4 9 Perhaps more importantly, the 1862 Act laid a tax on
legacies and distributive shares of personal property. The Act imposed a "duty
or tax" on any "property or interest therein, transferred by deed, grant, bargain,
sale, or gift, made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after
modem estate tax rates which range from 22% to 46%, depending on the size of the estate.
See I.R.C. 2001(c) (current rate schedule).
4 See Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 225 (citing Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. 17, 2 Stat 148).
41 Although the War of 1812 did not produce a succession tax, Secretary of the Treasury
Dallas did propose an inheritance tax in 1815 as a potential source of revenue. Eisenstein,
supra note 11, at 225. The proposed tax was intended to raise revenue, in part, to pay off
public debt created by the war. 6 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 887 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew
St. Clair Clarke eds., 1833). The proposal included two succession taxes, the first "upon
inheritances and devises, to be paid by the heirs or devisees ... to produce $900,000." The
second proposed tax was "upon bequests, legacies, and statutory distribution, to be paid by
the legatees, or legal representatives . . .to produce $500,000." Id. The Treaty of Ghent
ended the War of 1812 before these taxes could be acted upon. Johnson & Eller, supra note
28, at 64.
46 PAUL, supra note 18, at 15.
47 Id. In talking about the inheritance tax, Democratic Senator McDougall who was gener-
ally opposed to the levying of taxes (see infra note 49), declared that "[tlhose who pay it,
never having had it, never feel the loss of it." PAUL, supra note 18, at 15. McDougall said
that
A stamp tax put ... upon wills to be probated.., can be made so that the country will not feel it,
and only men of commerce will have to do with it, and they will pay promptly, and it will yield
really a large and substantive revenue.
CONG. GLOBE APP., 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 227, 231 (1862).
In making this statement, it appears that McDougall was providing early support for a pro-
gressive system of taxation. In essence, McDougall was arguing that it is best to lay a tax
upon "men of commerce," not only because they were more able to pay, but because they
would be more willing to pay.
18 The lowest stamp tax rate of fifty cents applied to estates valued at less than $2,500,
while the highest rates of upwards of twenty dollars applied to estates exceeding $ 100,000 in
value. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, 483. Estates valued between $100,000 and
$150,000 were assessed a duty of $20. An additional duty of $10 was assessed on each
additional $50,000, or portion thereof. Id.
49 See id. at 479-85. The proposed stamp duties affected so many facets of life that Senator
McDougall declared that "little girls will be computing what each stamp costs, and how
many stamps there are in the house, and the boys will be doing the same, and the wives will




the death of the grantor or bargainor."5° The tax applied only to legacies in
excess of $1000, and the rate was dependent upon the degree of consanguin-
ity. 5 Additionally, the statute provided that "all legacies or property passing
by will, or by the laws of any State or Territory, to husband or wife of the
person who died possessed ... shall be exempt from tax or duty.""2 The initial
tax, as enacted in 1862, applied only to personal property with real property
being exempt.
In 1864, Congress made substantial changes to the legacy tax that had
been passed in 1862."3 The 1864 Act raised the slightly increased tax rates.54
More importantly, the 1864 Act included a tax on the succession of real
estate.55 This tax applied to "every past or future disposition of real estate by
will, deed, or laws of descent, by reason whereof any perso[n] shall become
beneficially entitled, in possession or expectancy, to any real estate ... upon
the death of any person dying after the passing of this act."5 6 The rates on
succession of real estate were the same as the rates imposed on legacies of
personal property.57 However, while transfers of personal property between
spouses remained exempt,58 transfers of real estate between spouses were ini-
tially taxed, presumably at the same rates as transfers between strangers in
blood.59 Congress went on to retroactively exempt succession shares of wid-
ows.6" Still later, legacies of personal property to minor children were
exempted up to $1000 in value. 6'
There were some significant differences between the Civil War inheri-
tance tax and the modem estate tax. As already discussed, tax rates varied
according to degree of kinship. 62 Under both the 1862 and the 1864 acts, chari-
table organizations were taxed at the highest rate in accordance with other cor-
50 12 Stat. at 485.
"' Id. at 485-86 (showing rates of 0.75% for lineal issue, lineal ancestor, brother or sister;
1.5% for any descendant of a brother or sister of the decedent; 3% for aunts, uncles, or any
descendant thereof; 4% for great aunts, uncles, or any descendant thereof; and 5% for collat-
eral relatives not already mentioned, strangers in blood, or corporations). Id.
52 Id. at 486.
13 See Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 124-150, 13 Stat. 223, 285-291.
54 § 124, 13 Stat. at 285-86. The rates provided for by this section were: 1% for lineal
issue, lineal ancestor, brother or sister; 2% for any descendant of a brother or sister of the
decedent; 4% for aunts, uncles, or any descendant thereof; 5% for great aunts, uncles, or any
descendant thereof; and 6% for collateral relatives not already mentioned, strangers in blood,
or corporations. Id.
55 §§ 126-147, 13 Stat. at 287-91.
56 § 127, 13 Stat. at 287-88.
57 § 133, 13 Stat. at 288-89.
58 § 124, 13 Stat. at 285-86.
59 As originally written, the statute did not provide for spouses at all. See id. The only
category that could include spouses would be that of strangers in blood. Later in 1864, the
House of Representatives instructed the Ways and Means Committee to "inquire into the
expediency of so amending the laws . . . imposing taxes on inheritances as to exempt ... all
estates and interests of widows in the estates of their deceased husbands." H.R. Res. 124,
38th Cong. (1864), available at http://memory.loc.gov (transcript of original used).
I Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 481.
61 Act of July 13, 1866, ch.184, § 8, 14 Stat. 98, 140.
62 Representative John Armour Bingham did offer an amendment to make the rates uniform,
much like the modem estate tax. PAUL, supra note 18, at 15.
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porate beneficiaries. 63 Also, the acts contained the beginnings of the modem
transfer tax system.6 4
Despite congressional allure with taxing inheritances, 65 and despite being
equally in need of revenue, the Confederacy chose not to tax inheritances dur-
ing this same time period. Instead, the Confederate government laid a tax on
"any property" acquired by its citizens during the Civil War, but specifically
exempted inheritances.66
The federal inheritance tax was repealed in 1870 after the conclusion of
the Civil War.6 7 Two years later, the stamp duty on letters of probate and
administration was repealed. 68 The taxes had not invoked widespread protest,
but the repeal was in accordance with the assumption that taxes accompany
war, and are significantly decreased at the end of conflict.
69
C. The Spanish American War Tax
Inheritance taxation did not technically reappear in the United States until
1898 with the advent of the Spanish American War.7 ° "An Act to provide
ways and means to meet war expenditures and for other purposes" was enacted
by Congress in 1898 in an effort to raise revenue for the Spanish American
War.7 1 As part of this act, a tax was levied on all personal property transferred
after death. 72 As with the inheritance tax of 1862, transfers of real property
63 Attempts to exempt charitable organizations failed in both 1862 and 1864. In 1862,
Republican Representative William Payne Sheffield offered a proposal to exempt religious,
charitable, and literary organizations. Id. at 15. In 1864, Republican Senator Francis Ker-
nan requested that bequests to charity be exempt from inheritance taxation. 34 CONG.
GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1718, 1881 (1864).
6 For instance, where any transfer of real estate "purport[ed] to take effect presently," but
beneficial ownership remained with the grantor, the tax applied as if the transfer was "a
succession derived from the person making the disposition as the predecessor." Compare
1864 Revenue Act, ch. 173, § 132, 13 Stat. 223, 288, with I.R.C. § 2038 (2004). In addition,
the 1864 Act included that real property passed during one's lifetime, and not accompanied
by valuable consideration, would be "held and taken to confer upon the grantee a succession
within the meaning of this act." 1864 Revenue Act, ch. 173, § 131, 13 Stat. at 288. This
clause represents the first gift tax to appear in the United States. Johnson & Eller, supra
note 28, at 65.
65 PAUL, supra note 18, at 15. "No one objected when a congressman observed that 'there
is no property on which a tax can better be laid than upon inheritances.'" Id.
66 7 JOURNAL OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 638 (February
23, 1865).
67 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, §3, 16 Stat. 256.
68 Act of June 6, 1872, ch.315, § 36, 17 Stat. 256.
69 Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 226.
70 In 1894, Congress enacted the first wide-reaching income tax. Act of August 27, 1984,
ch.349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509. Under this act, all income exceeding $1,000 annually was taxed
at a rate of 2%, with income including "money and the value of all personal property
acquired by gift or inheritance." Id. at 553. Therefore, while this act did not levy an inheri-
tance tax, per se, inheritances of personal property were taxed as income. In contrast, inheri-
tances of real property continued to go untaxed. The income tax was short-lived, and was
invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1895. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429 (1895), rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
7" Act of June 13, 1898, ch.448, §§ 29-30, 30 Stat. 448.
72 Id. at 464.
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were excluded from taxation. Also, transfers between spouses were not
taxed.7 3
Tax rates under the 1898 Act depended on both the size of the total estate
and the degree of consanguinity of the beneficiary, causing legal scholars to
split on whether the tax should be classified as an inheritance tax or an estate
tax.7 4 Smaller estates were taxed at a lower rate, with estates valued at between
$10,000 and $25,000 taxed between 0.75% and 5%, and estates valued at over
one million dollars taxed between 2.25% and 15%. 75 Assessing a tax based on
the value of the full estate, rather than the value of individual legacies, differed
markedly from previous inheritance taxes in which only the size of the legacy
was considered. At the same time, levying a tax on the full value of the estate
is closer in structure to the modem estate tax than the 1797 and Civil War
taxes.
The 1898 Inheritance Tax brought with it the first real public controversy
with regard to an inheritance tax.76 By 1898, private American fortunes had
begun to accumulate, causing the public to look at an inheritance tax as a
means by which to limit inheritance.77 Within the Senate, Henry Cabot Lodge
73 Id. at 465.
74 PAUL, supra note 18, at 66. "The emphasis of the tax was on the transmission of prop-
erty; from this standpoint it was, therefore, in a technical sense, a modified estate duty
imposed upon the estate itself, or the right to transmit the property in the estate, rather than
an inheritance tax, which would fall upon the recipients of the estate distributed, or their
right to receive the estate." Id. But see JESSE DUKEMINLER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 977 (2000) (noting that first U.S. estate tax was enacted in
1916).
75 § 29, 30 Stat. at 464-65. The following table delineates the applicable tax rates based
both on the size of the estate and the degree of consanguinity between the decedent and
beneficiary.
Any other
Sibling of degree of
Sibling of grandparent, consanguinity,
Lineal issue, parent, or or descendant stranger in
lineal descendant of of blood, a body
ancestor, or Descendant of parent's grandparent's impolitic or
sibling sibling sibling sibling corporation
Estate valued
at less than -0- -0- -0- -0- -0-
$10,000
$10,000 to 0.75% 1.5% 3% 4% 5%
$25,000
$25,000 to 1.125% 2.25% 4.5% 6% 7.5%
$100,000
$100,000 to 1.5% 3% 6% 8% 10%
$500,000
$500,000 to 1.875% 3.75% 7.5% 10% 12.5%
$1,000,000
Estate valued
at over 2.25% 4.5% 9% 12% 15%
$1,000,000 1
76 Johnson & Eller, supra note 28, at 69.
77 PAUL, supra note 18, at 66. Among those arguing that inherited wealth should be limited
by a tax upon inheritances was Andrew Carnegie, who published his "Gospel of Wealth" in
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78
and Stephen V. Elkins were the main opponents of the inheritance tax.
Elkins said that an inheritance tax was a very dangerous measure, which a
small war such as the Spanish American War did not justify.79 Also, Lodge
and Elkins stated that inheritance taxation should be left exclusively to the
states.80 These arguments play a significant role in determining whether fed-
eral taxation of inheritances is within the founding vision. Voices of dissent,
with regard to an inheritance tax, had not previously been expressed in the
United States.
In 1898, during discussion on the repeal of the inheritance tax, Congress-
man Oscar Underwood declared, "The inheritance tax is levied on a class of
wealth, a class of property, and a class of citizens that do not otherwise pay
their fair share of the burdens of Government. ' 81 Despite Congressman Under-
wood's argument, the inheritance tax of 1898 was repealed in 1902 shortly
after the conclusion of the Spanish American War.82
D. Modem Estate Tax
83
Four years after the repeal of the Spanish American War tax, Theodore
Roosevelt began advocating for the return of an inheritance tax in order to
"improve the distribution of the tax burden." 84 This represents the first major
push in which federal death taxation was proposed as a means by which to
control hereditary wealth. 85 Pressure to enact a tax on inherited wealth contin-
ued over the next decade.
86
1890. In it, he argues that there is no injustice in denying heirs an inheritance, as they had
done nothing to earn such wealth, and that a heavy inheritance tax should be enacted to
prevent the transmission of large accumulations of wealth. Id. at 65-66. Carnegie gained
much public support for his proposal, although among his own class he was largely viewed
as a traitor. Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 226.
78 PAUL, supra note 18, at 67.
79 Id.
80 Id. In the more general sense, Elkins argued that an inheritance tax "favors spending as
you go, on the theory the Government will take it away when you die. What will be the
incentive to accumulation if you can tax inheritances? . . . [W]e are . . . breaking down
ancient traditions." 31 CONG. Rac. 5082 (1898).
8' 35 CONG. REC. 1830 (1902). The implication of Congressman Underwood's statement is
that without the inheritance tax, the wealthy were not paying their "fair share" of the burden
of government. This is contrary to statements made by McDougall, who in 1862 supported
the inheritance tax not because he felt that the wealthy were not paying their fair share, but
because "men of commerce" are both more able to pay taxes and more willing. See supra
note 47, and accompanying text. The distinction between these statements highlights ideo-
logical differences between a proportional tax system and a progressive tax system.
82 Act of Apr. 12, 1902, ch. 500, § 7, 32 Stat. 96, 97.
83 This section covers only major changes to the federal estate tax and should not be viewed
as a comprehensive history of the federal estate tax since 1916. For a complete overview of
the federal estate tax since 1916, see JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 105T CONG.,
PRESENT LAW & BACKGROUND RELATING TO ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES (Comm. Print 1998).
84 Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 228. Roosevelt proposed a progressive tax that would "put a
constantly increasing burden on the inheritance of those swollen fortunes which it is cer-
tainly of no benefit to this country to perpetuate." Id. at 229 (quoting 17 WORKS OF THEO-
DORE ROOSEVELT 434 (Memorial ed. 1925)).
85 See id. at 228.
86 The 1906 inheritance tax proposal failed for lack of Congressional support. Johnson &
Eller, supra note 28, at 72. Three years later, in 1909, Congressman Sereno Payne proposed
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Amidst calls for a tax on inheritances to be used to level inherited wealth,
the advent of World War I finally gave Congress the impetus to pass the federal
estate tax. 8" The Revenue Act of 191688 provided for a progressive estate
tax, 89 with rates ranging from between 1% and 10%.90 Following the conclu-
sion of World War I in 1918, instead of repealing the estate tax as had been
done with previous federal death taxes, Congress reduced rates on smaller
estates but did not reduce the maximum rate for large estates. 9 '
Congress' choice to reduce the estate tax after the conclusion of World
War I, instead of repealing the tax, represented a significant change in the use
of federal estate taxation. Estate taxation was no longer a means by which to
raise revenue in times of exigency. Rather, estate taxation became a way to
fund day-to-day government operations.92
Significant changes to the rate and structure of the estate tax were made in
1924. 93 The late 1920s ushered in the Mellon Era, during which Secretary of
a progressive inheritance tax with the endorsement of President William Howard Taft. The
inheritance tax was proposed as a way to counteract the shortages that had resulted from the
bank panic of 1907. Id. Although Representative Payne described the tax as being both
"correct in principle and easy to collect," the Senate dropped the inheritance tax after they
instead enacted a corporate excise tax. Id. In 1912, the Progressive Party added its support
for an inheritance tax, viewing the inheritance tax as a way to equalize holders of property.
Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 229. Despite growing support, in 1913, Congress failed to pass
another proposal for a federal inheritance tax. Id.
87 Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 230.
88 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200-212, 39 Stat. 756, 777-80 (1916).
89 An exemption of $50,000 was allowed, below which no estate tax was levied.
§ 203(a)(2), 39 Stat. at 778. The taxable estate included all property owned by the decedent
at death, certain lifetime transfers made for inadequate consideration, transfers not intended
to take effect until death, and transfers made in contemplation of death. § 202(b), 39 Stat. at
777-78.
90 § 201, 39 Stat. at 777. The following rates were in effect for the value of taxable estate in
excess of the $50,000 exemption: 1% for the first $50,000 of taxable estate; 2% on the
excess value between $50,000 and $150,000; 3% on the excess value between $150,000 and
$250,000; 4% on the excess value between $250,000 and $450,000; 5% on the excess value
between $450,000 and $1,000,000; 6% on the excess value between $1,000,000 and
$2,000,0000; 7% on the excess value between $2,000,000 and $3,000,000; 8% on the excess
value between $3,000,000 and $4,000,000; 9% on the excess value between $4,000,000 and
$5,000,000; and 10% on any value exceeding $5,000,000. Id. As World War I intensified,
these rates were raised by 50% in early 1917, resulting in rates that ranged from 2% on the
first $50,000 of taxable estate to a maximum rate of 25% on estates exceeding $10 million in
value. Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 230-231 (citing Revenue Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63,
§ 900, 40 Stat. 300, 324).
1 Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 231 (citing Revenue Act of 1918, § 401).
92 See infra Part IV.
93 Perhaps most importantly, in 1924, Congress passed a gift tax to prevent taxpayers from
avoiding the tax through inter vivos giving. Id. at 232; JOINT COMMIrEE ON TAXATION,
105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW & BACKGROUND RELATING TO ESTATE AND GiFr TAXES
(Comm. Print 1998). The maximum estate tax rate was raised to 40%. Eisenstein, supra
note 11, at 232 (citing Revenue Act of 1924, §§ 301, 319-24). The tax was also broadened
so as to include jointly owned property and retained interests in property, which continues to
be in effect today. See I.R.C. 2038 (2004). A credit, not to exceed 25% of the federal estate
tax, was added to allow for amounts paid in state inheritance tax. Eisenstein, supra note 11,
at 232. The state credit has since been replaced with a deduction for state inheritance taxes.
I.R.C. § 2058. (2004).
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Treasury Andrew Mellon mounted an attack against the federal estate tax.94
Recent events aside, the Mellon era was the last great challenge to the federal
estate tax.95 The Mellon led attack against the federal estate tax came to its
conclusion when in 1931, faced with a mounting deficit attributable to the
Great Depression, Mellon advocated for an increase in the estate tax rates.96
By 1941, the top estate tax rate had reached 77% in anticipation of World War
II
97
Between the conclusion of World War II and the signing of the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act in 2001,98 the federal estate tax
underwent a variety of changes, 99 the most significant of which were contained
in Tax Reform Act of 1976100 and the Economic Recovery Act of 1981.' 01 n
December of 1998, the Joint Economic Committee issued a report on the eco-
14 Andrew Mellon served as Secretary of the Treasury from 1921 until his death in 1932.
During his tenure, Mellon opposed the estate tax for two chief reasons. "First, Mellon com-
plained that an estate tax was a tax on capital used to finance the ordinary expenses of
government." M. Susan Murnane, Andrew Mellon's Unsuccessful Attempt to Repeal Estate
Taxes, 108 TAX NOTES 1177, 1183 (2005). Second, Mellon believed that the need "to pay
large taxes out of estate assets caused the market value of those assets to decline signifi-
cantly." Id. Based on these two arguments, Mellon argued for the complete repeal of all
estate taxes. Congress, however, was unwilling to pass a full repeal of the tax, and instead
reduced the rates in 1926 and raised the exemption amount from $50,000 to $100,000. Rev-
enue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 303(a)(4), 44 Stat. 9, 73. The federal gift tax, however, was fully
repealed. § 324, 44 Stat. at 86.
95 Murnane, supra note 94, at 1177.
96 Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 234. In answer to Mellon's advocacy, Congress imposed
new rates that started at one percent on the first $10,000 of taxable estate, and went as high
as 45% on estates in excess of $10 million. Revenue Act of 1832, ch. 209, § 401(b), 47 Stat.
169, 243-244. In addition, the exemption was lowered back to $50,000 (§ 401(c)), the credit
for state inheritance taxes was repealed (§ 402(a)), and a new gift tax was imposed (§§ 501-
532)).
97 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW & BACKGROUND RELAT-
ING TO ESTATE AND GiFr TAXES PART I B (Comm. Print 1998).
98 Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
99 Aside from the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, a
significant amount of legislation was passed between 1984 and 1997 affecting the federal
estate tax. For a summary of these changes see JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 105TH
CONG., PRESENT LAW & BACKGROUND RELATING TO ESTATE AND GiFr TAXES PART I B
(Comm. Print 1998).
100 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520. In 1976, a unified credit
was enacted, which exempted $175,625 worth of transfers from estate and gift taxation, and
the maximum tax rate was decreased to 70%. The Act provided for an irrebuttable presump-
tion that all transfers of property made within three years of death were made in contempla-
tion of death, and therefore subject to estate taxation. Id. Also, a $250,000 marital
deduction was provided for which allowed for the transfer of property between spouses
without incurring tax liability. Id.
101 Among other changes, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 401, 95 Stat. 172, provided for an unlimited marital deduction so long as certain requisites
were met. § 403, 95 Stat. at 172. The act also increased the amount of the unified credit to
$600,000 and reduced the top estate tax rate from 70% to 50% over a four year period.
§ 401-402, 95 Stat, at 172. The phase-in of the lower tax rate was delayed for several
years. See JOINT COMMI-rEE ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW & BACKGROUND
RELATING TO ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES PART I.B. (Comm. Print 1998). On December 31,
1992, the top estate tax rate finally dropped to 50%. However, subsequent legislation retro-
actively raised the top rate to 55%, dating back to January 1, 1993. Id.
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nomics of the estate tax and ultimately recommended repeal. 10 2 In the execu-
tive summary, the estate tax is described as being in violation of "the basic
principles of a good tax system: it is complicated, unfair and inefficient."1 3
The report advanced several arguments against the estate tax. Most notably,
that the estate tax hinders entrepreneurial ventures and depletes the nation's
capital.'0" Inherited wealth was not found to be a problem in the United
States.10 5 It was also found that the estate tax was ineffective at generating
revenue because of the federal revenue lost as a result of tax avoidance, 10 6 and
because estate tax avoidance led to increased administration costs that cut
against net revenue generated from the tax.'0 7
Presumably, in response to these concerns, in 2001, Congress passed Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act, which President George W. Bush
later signed into law.' 0 8 The act represents a compromise between those who
oppose estate taxation and those who believe that the tax furthers democratic
principles.'0 9 Prior to estate tax repeal in 2010, it can be assumed that the
estate tax will once again be discussed on the Congressional floor. The remain-
ing portions of this paper examine the principles of our Founding Fathers in
order to discern whether the estate tax fits within the founding vision.
IV. FUNDING A NATION: EXPECTATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO EVERYDAY REVENUE
The modem estate tax has several elements that differ from its predeces-
sors. Most importantly among these differences is that the modern estate tax is
used to finance the day-to-day operations of the federal government, whereas
102 JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 105th CONG., THE ECONOMICS OF THE ESTATE TAX
(1998), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/fiscal/tx-grwth/estattax/estattax.htm. Mur-
nane notes that in large part, the arguments against the estate tax advanced in this report
match the arguments advanced by Andrew Mellon in the 1920s. Murnane, supra note 94, at
1177.
103 JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 105TH CONG., THE ECONOMICS OF THE ESTATE TAX III
(1998).
104 Id.
105 The report states that, "Far from being a static economy where wealth is permanently
locked in the hands of a few families, the American economy is best characterized as fluid
and dynamic, where new wealth is constantly created and old wealth is naturally dispersed
though intergenerational transfers." Id. at 6-7.
106 A study by Stanford University economist Douglas Bernheim found that federal income
tax revenue is lost as a result of parents shifting income to children, who are generally in
lower tax brackets, in an effort to avoid estate tax liability after death. Id. at 14. (citing B.
Douglas Bemheim, Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue?, in 1 TAX POLICY AND THE ECON-
OMY 113-38 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1987)).
107 See id. at 14.
108 See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38, (2001). Since the passage of the act, estate tax rates have been gradually
decreasing while the exemption gradually increases. See I.R.C. § 2001(c) (2004) (schedule
for decreased estate tax rate) and I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2004) (schedule for increasing unified
credit). In the year 2010, the estate tax will be facing repeal. § 2010. As it presently stands,
in 2011 the estate tax will return, with a top rate of 45% and a unified credit amount of
$1,000,000. § 2010(c).
" Jeffery A. Cooper et al., State Estate Taxes After EGTRRA: A Long Day's Journey Into
Night, 17 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 90, 92 n.l 1 (2003).
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historical death taxes were used only in times of war.' 1O Whether the current
use of the federal estate tax falls within the founding vision is largely depen-
dent upon whether the Founders would have viewed the estate tax as an appro-
priate, permanent mechanism by which to raise everyday revenue.
In order to make this determination, it first becomes important to discern
how our Founders intended to finance the nation. Of course, there is no easy
answer to this. The Founders came from varying backgrounds, had differing
philosophies, and were destined to have divergent views from one another; the
views of one of these men cannot serve to speak for all of the Founding
Fathers. Also times have changed dramatically since the founding,"' as have
the financial needs of the country.'l 2 While the Constitution was built to grow
with a developing nation, the period of its creation will forever remain the late
1700s. To determine how the estate tax fits in with the founding vision, eight-
eenth century ideals must be translated into the modern reality of the twenty-
first century.
Providing government revenue for the colonial and early American gov-
ernments was a wholly different venture than it is today. Public expenditures
during the colonial era were modest and central government had few responsi-
bilities; public works were "trivial," there were no social welfare appropria-
tions, and government officials served as volunteers, resulting in little need for
government revenue. 1 3 Nevertheless, the colonial tax system, consisting pri-
marily of poll, faculty and property taxes, and duties on commerce, was "inade-
quate even for ... modest needs."
' 14
The Articles of Confederation did not provide for a system of taxation,
which has historically been cited as one of its major downfalls." 5 "The law-
yers at the Continental Congress were more adept with words than at the job of
providing money. '  Under the Articles of Confederation, the national gov-
ernment survived by requisitioning the states in proportion to value of land and
improvements.' " The states largely regarded these requisitions as "voluntary
1I0 See supra Part III.
'' In case there is any doubt about how time effectuates change, consider that in an 1862
speech, Senator John Alexander McDougall opposed the taxation of lawyers' incomes, stat-
ing, "How can you tax the income of a lawyer who keeps no books? It is not the habit of
lawyers to keep an exact account either of their expenditures or incomes." CONG. GLOBE.
App., 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 227, 231 (1862) (Speech of Hon. J.A. McDougall). Today, most
lawyers working in law firms would find this to be a wholly inaccurate reflection of the inner
workings of modem law practice.
112 From 1789 to 1849, government outlays totaled $1,090,000,000. For the year 2006, it is
estimated that government outlays will total $2,369,105,000,000. OFFICE OF MGM'T &
BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 25-26 (2003), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2003/pdf/hist.pdf.




''7 Federal requisition of the states entailed the government telling states that they owed a
certain amount in taxes. The states would be responsible for collecting this amount from its
residents, and forwarding it to the federal government. CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS
ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES 15 (2005) [hereinafter JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER] (citing
to ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. VIII). Ostensibly, Federal requisitions were appor-
Winter 2005/2006]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
contributions" or "alms," and according to Paul, the federal requests were "gen-
erally ignored."' 18 With time, "the payment of taxes came ... to be regarded
as a romantically honorable act, or even as a sort of amiable and quixotic mani-
festation of eccentricity."' "9
By 1782, government vaults were literally empty and the national govern-
ment defaulted on its debt.' 20 In the last requisition before the Constitution,
Congress "mandated that states pay $3,800,000 (in requisitions], but it col-
lected only $663." '21 Regarding the failure of requisitions, James Madison
wrote, "A radical vice of the requisition system.., was its assumption that the
states would respect the Republican cause and pay their requisitions, without
opposition.'
122
Legal scholar Calvin Johnson hypothesizes that failure of the Articles of
Confederation can almost be entirely attributed to the failure of the states to pay
requisitions and to approve a federal impost. 12 3 In the words of Johnson, the
"action of the states in their defaults of requisitions and in veto of the impost
was sin, disease, wickedness, and vice."'12 ' Angry with the states for their fail-
ure to pay requisitions, the Framers of the Constitution determined that a
stronger federal government, with the power to tax the people directly, was
necessary for the preservation of the Union. 125 Requisition had already failed,
and taxation proved to be a more appealing option than "the ancient device of
escheat," even though the difference between taxation and escheat may be the
difference between "tweedledee and tweedledum."'
126
tioned among the states according the value of the state's land and improvements. However,
under the Articles of Confederation, the value of a state's land and improvements was deter-
mined by using a census count. Therefore, in reality, requisitions were apportioned among
the states according to population, rather than the value of the land. Calvin H. Johnson,
Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-Up in the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 2 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes].
118 PAUL, supra note 18, at 5.
119 Id. In contrast to this point of view, Brown says that "state governments met a greater
proportion of their quotas than is often recognized." ROGER H. BROWN, REDEEMING THE
REPUBLIC: FEDERALISTS, TAXATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 13 (1993).
Rather, the states actually made substantial contributions to the requisition system, showing
an overall rate of compliance of 37% between October 1781 and August 1786. Id. at 12.
However, by the end of 1786, state compliance fell to 2 percent. Id. at 25.
120 Id.
121 JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER, supra note 117, at 15. The final requisition before to the
enacting of the Constitution occurred in 1786. Id.
122 Id. at 4 (citing James Madison).
123 So that it would not have to rely entirely on requisitions, Congress proposed a 5% tax on
imports in 1781. This tax was known as the impost. Under the Articles of Confederation, in
order for the impost to take effect, all thirteen states had to endorse it. Rhode Island vetoed
the impost. Id. at 27. Johnson hypothesizes that the states' failure to pay requisitions, and
the failure of Rhode Island to approve the impost, ultimately led to the creation of a strong
federal government under the Constitution. See id. at 1-11.
124 Id. at 3.
125 Id. at 1-5.
126 James Hagerman, Jr., The Federal Estate Tax: Grounds for Adoption of this Method of
Taxation in America, Brief Comment on U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on the Subject, and
Suggestion of Certain Inequities in Operation that Might Be Removed, 8 A.B.A. J. 92, 92
(1922).
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Ratification of the Constitution was a hotly debated topic, and the final
version of the Constitution represents the embodiment of the compromises that
were necessary in order to sway the votes needed for ratification. 2 7 Because
some of the words of the Constitution were penned only in the spirit of compro-
iise, they may not accurately reflect the full intentions of the Founders. This
is perhaps nowhere more true than it is with regard to the issue of federal
taxation, which was central in the Constitutional debate.' 2 8
A. Construing the Words of the Constitution
The constitutionality of the federal estate tax is not at issue, as the matter
has been decided by the Supreme Court on multiple occasions. 29 However,
constitutional intent is relevant in trying to determine whether the use of a
permanent estate tax falls within the founding vision. Two tax-specific issues
arise when trying to discern constitutional intent with regard to taxation. The
first of these issues involves the intended scope of the Congressional taxing
power. The second issue is whether the estate tax would be considered a direct
tax, and whether such a distinction would place additional limits on its use.
As ratified in 1787, Article I, section 8, of the United States Constitution
states, "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States."' 3 ° The scope of the congres-
sional power to tax was originally limited by the Direct Taxation Clause, which
provides that direct taxes laid by Congress "shall be apportioned among the
several states."' 31 Under the Direct Taxation Clause, Congress could only
impose those "direct taxes" that could be evenly apportioned among the states;
the power to lay all other direct taxes was reserved to the states.
32
From the earliest days of the Constitution, it was known among the draft-
ers that the words of the Constitution did not adequately reflect the intent
behind the General Welfare Clause and the Direct Taxation Clause, thereby
calling into question even U.S. Supreme Court opinions interpreting the
clauses. For example, James Madison found himself involved in debates on the
Congressional floor regarding the scope of the general welfare provision,
133
and Founders sitting on the early Supreme Court defined direct taxes "cre-
atively" in order to "avoid the apportionment requirement in cases in which
127 Aaron J. O'Brien, States' Repeal: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Reinvigo-
rate Federalism, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 547, 552-53 (1996) (stating that compromise domi-
nated the Constitutional Convention).
128 JOHNSON, RIGHrEOUS ANGER, supra note 117, at 1-11.
129 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
130 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
131 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (1913).
132 In Pollock, the Supreme Court said that "the acceptance of the rule of apportionment
was one of the compromises which made the adoption of the Constitution possible ... [B]y
calling a tax indirect when it is essentially direct, the rule of protection could be frittered
away, one of the great landmarks defining the boundary between... Nation and ... States."
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895).
133 See JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT 98 (1999).
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apportionment would have been unreasonable."' 34  Such ambiguity has
resulted in a situation in which the intent behind the Constitution, rather than
the words of the Constitution, must be used to determine whether the estate tax
fits within the founding vision.
1. The General Welfare Clause
Despite the presence of the Direct Taxation Clause, the General Welfare
Clause of the Constitution still reserves to Congress a broad power of taxation,
which opponents of the Constitution viewed as a danger to states' rights.135 At
the Virginia convention, George Mason interpreted the General Welfare Clause
as a "second Necessary and Proper Clause allowing Congress to legislate in any
way it pleased, and in that light opposed it.'
136
However, the Framers of the Constitution did not intend for Congress to
take full advantage of the power of taxation granted under the Constitution in
order to fund the day-to-day operations of the government. 137 In responding to
Mason's concerns, George Nicholas and Edmund Randolph told the Virginia
convention that the General Welfare Clause would only permit the federal gov-
ernment to pay the debts of the United States.' 38 Speaking on the Congres-
sional floor, James Madison advocated for a narrow reading of the General
Welfare Clause for the purposes of spending, arguing that Congressional
spending was limited to the enumerated powers listed in Article I, section 8 of
the Constitution. 139 By extrapolation, it can be presumed that Madison would
have favored the idea that the General Welfare Clause no more gave Congress
the power to tax without limitation, than it gave Congress the power to spend
without limitation.
Likewise, the states that ratified the Constitution did not expect Congress
to take full advantage of its broad power of taxation. At least five states ratified
the Constitution, only on the condition that
Congress [would] not lay direct taxes but when the moneys arising from impost,
excise, and their other resources, are insufficient for the public exigencies, nor then,
until Congress shall have first made a requisition upon the states to assess, levy, and
pay, their respective proportions of such requisition, agreeably to the census fixed in
the said Constitution, in such way and manner as the legislature of the state shall
think best. 140
1 Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes, supra note 117, at 3.
131 In general, anti-federalists felt that the Constitution granted too much control to the
federal government, especially with regard to issues of taxation. For example, in 1788
before the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Patrick Henry opposed the Constitution on the
basis that it gave the federal government, among other things, "a power of direct taxation,
unbounded and unlimited." Speech of Patrick Henry, in THE ESSENTIAL FEDERALIST AND
ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 31 (David Wootton ed., 2003).
136 LYNCH, supra note 133, at 99.
137 As evidence of this, James Madison had originally advocated that the federal govern-
ment should have a limited power of taxation. However, the final version of the Constitution
grated plenary power of taxation. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOuS ANGER, supra note 117, at 126.
38 LYNCH, supra note 133, at 99.
139 Id. at 98.
140 In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the State of New Hampshire, June the
21st, 1788, in 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS AND THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 326 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 1 THE
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Broadly speaking, it was intended that Congress would primarily use taxes
on commerce to fund the nation.' 4 ' In a letter dated 1828, James Madison
wrote that Congress' power to tax commerce was its primary means by which
to raise revenue, with state taxation powers "limited to direct taxes on land or
other property, to arbitrary assessments on invisible funds, and to the odious tax
on persons."' 14 2 Taxes on commerce were intended to supply the fledgling fed-
eral government with the majority of needed revenue, with other internal taxes
to be turned to only in times of desperate need.
2. The Direct Taxation Clause
Whether taxes on inheritances and estates would have been considered
direct taxes by the Founders remains an open question. The term "direct taxes"
is not defined by the Constitution, which led to problems in early litigation as
courts were forced to judge the constitutionality of federally imposed taxes. 14 3
Prior to the Constitutional Convention, the term "direct tax" had rarely
been used in the United States.'" In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamil-
ton said that direct taxes primarily included levies on land and buildings, 45 but
records of debates from the Constitutional Convention do not support the con-
tention that this was the definition adopted. The states that ratified the Consti-
tution used the term "direct tax" in five different ways: "(1) as a tax on the
states, (2) as a land tax, (3) as a land and poll tax, (4) as a poll tax, together
with a general assessment on property, and (5) as a tax on land, together with
the specific articles of personal property."' 46 Members of the Convention used
"direct tax" in at least three different ways. 147 At one point, "King asked the
Convention what was the precise meaning of 'direct taxation' and Madison
reports that 'no one answered.' "148
The phrase "direct taxation" was included in the Constitution after exten-
sive debates regarding the inclusion of slaves into state census counts. 14 9 State
census counts were to be used in determining representation in the House of
Representatives. 1 5 0 Southern states wished to count slaves toward the total
state population, so as to increase their representation in the Assembly.
1 5 1
Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby three-fifths of the number of
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS]. Contingencies from South Carolina,
Rhode Island, Massachusetts and New York passed provisions almost identical to that of
New Hampshire. I THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra, at 322-23,
325, 329, 335.
141 Impost and excise duties are both taxes laid upon commerce. BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 605, 772 (8th ed. 2004).
142 James Madison, Letter 1: Madison on Tariffs, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 15, at 600, 605.
143 See e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796) (holding that a direct tax is one
which can be apportioned among the states).
144 PAUL, supra note 18, at 49.
145 FEDERALIST No. 36 (Alexander Hamilton).
146 PAUL, supra note 18, at 49.
147 Id.
148 Id.





slaves would be counted toward state representation, but taxes would be appor-
tioned among the states according to this same census count. 152 Therefore,
while Southern states would benefit from the three-fifths compromise by get-
ting to count the slaves toward representation, they could also suffer tax
consequences.
As evidence of this, during the Convention, a motion was presented to
strike "and direct taxes" from Article I, section 2, as it was "improperly placed
in a clause relating merely to the constitution of the House of Representa-
tives."15 3 In response, Gouverneur Morris said, "The insertion here was in con-
sequence of what had passed on this point; in order to exclude the appearance
of counting the negroes in the representation. The including of them may now
be referred to the object of direct taxes."' 54 Because "direct taxation" is the
product of an ancillary debate concerning slavery, the exact intent behind the
inclusion of the phase is not known.
The U.S. Supreme Court first faced the difficulty associated with interpret-
ing the term "direct taxes" in the case of Hylton v. United States. 155 Hylton
presented the question of whether a federal tax levied on carriages was a direct
tax under the Constitution, and would therefore be subject to the apportionment
rule.' 56 Reflecting upon the uncertainty of the meaning of "direct taxation,"
former Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton said, "We shall seek in
vain for any antecedent settled legal meaning to the respective terms-there is
none."1
57
Through a plurality opinion, the Hylton court held that direct taxes include
only those taxes which Congress can apportion among the several states
according to the census.' 58 The same opinion was earlier expressed by Con-
gressman Theodore Sedgwick, who believed that a "direct tax" could not be
"incapable of apportionment."' 59 This interpretation of direct taxes should be
given special deference as the justices sitting on the Supreme Court at the time
of Hylton had been "core Framers" with regard to apportionment and tax issues
during the Constitutional Convention.' 6 °
Nearly 100 years later, the court in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
held that the federal income tax was unconstitutional, because as a direct tax it
152 Under the Articles of Confederation, federal taxes were collected through requisitions.
See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text. Because requisitions were apportioned
according to population, any increase in the population meant an increase in the state's share
of taxes. Therefore, the ability to count three-fifths of a state's slaves toward representation
not only meant increased representation in the House of Representatives, but it also meant
that the same census count would be used in apportioning taxes, thereby resulting in slave
states being assessed increased taxes.
153 JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 720 (E.H. Scott ed. 2002)
(1787) (statements of Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Wilson).
"I Id. at 720 (Gouverneur Morris' response to Mr. Dickinson's proposed amendment strik-
ing "direct taxes").
"I Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
156 Id. at 176,
157 PAUL, supra note 18, at 49.
158 Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174.
159 May 6, 1794, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 15, at
433.
16 Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes, supra note 117, at 74-75.
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was required to be evenly apportioned among the states. 16 1 The Pollock court
determined that the federal income tax was a direct tax because it taxed income
derived from real and personal property, and a tax upon the income from prop-
erty is an indirect (direct) tax upon the property itself. 162 Hylton held that a
direct tax was one that could be apportioned, but Pollock overturned this defi-
nition. The result of Pollock was essentially a return to an indeterminate state
in which the nation, once again, was without a concise definition of direct taxa-
tion. Pollock, however, became largely irrelevant after the ratification of the
Sixteenth Amendment, which eliminated the apportionment requirement.
163
The public largely viewed the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment as a
"recall" of the Pollock decision."'
The distinction between direct taxation and indirect taxation is important
with regard to the estate tax as the ratification of the Constitution was based
upon an understanding that Congress would levy direct taxes only as a last
resort, after other revenue generating measures had failed.165 Using the Hylton
definition of direct taxes, the estate tax would not be considered a direct tax as
Congress would be unable to apportion it.166 Conversely, under Pollock, the
estate tax would be a direct tax as it indirectly falls upon property. 167 Since the
term was not defined, either in text or in debates, there is no solid evidence as
to how the Founders would have viewed the estate tax. However, the holding
of the Hylton court should be viewed as the most persuasive authority available
since the case was decided by four of the Founding Fathers.
1 68
V. INHERITANCES AS AN APPROPRIATE SUBJECT FOR TAXATION
Based on the power of taxation granted by the Constitution, by 1794, "[i]t
had been universally concluded, and never . . . denied ... that the legislature
• ..had authority to impose taxes on every subject of revenue." 169 Despite
granting to Congress broad powers of taxation, the Founders were of the opin-
ion that some subjects were more appropriate for taxation than others. For
161 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
162 This holding was overturned by the modem Supreme Court. See South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). For a more in-depth discussion of the Pollock and Baker deci-
sions see Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes, supra note 117, at 77.
163 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
164 Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes, supra note 117, at 77.
165 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
166 See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 171, 174 (1796). Apportionment requires
the federal government to levy taxes upon each of the states in proportion to population.
This is not possible with an estate tax as Congress cannot control how many decedents will
be present in each state, nor the wealth of decedents.
167 See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 607 (1895). Like the federal
income tax, the estate tax falls "indirectly" upon property. Without property, there will be
no tax levying. Also, the tax base for the tax is computed using the value of property
transferred.
168 Johnson argues that the holding in Hylton should be viewed as a constitutional mandate
because the "extraordinary actors" who decided Hylton were four of the Founding Fathers.
Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes, supra note 117, at 75. If constitutional construc-
tion is to be based upon founding intent, then Hylton embodies that intent. Id.
169 Direct Taxes, in 4 DE3ATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 15, at 433 (state-
ment by Mr. Sedwick).
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instance, taxation of commerce was viewed not only as an effective means by
which to raise revenue, but also as a mechanism by which to regulate
commerce. 1
70
Whether the Founders would have viewed inheritances as a proper subject
for taxation can be analyzed from two different standpoints: first, whether per-
sonal property would have been viewed as an appropriate subject for taxation;
and second, whether transfers of property at death would have been viewed as
an appropriate subject for taxation. Because an inheritance tax was instituted
as early as 1797,171 a mere ten years after the adoption of the Constitution,
there is some evidence that the idea of taxing inheritances was not overtly out-
landish in the eyes of the Founders. However, "[s]ince taxes on ... gifts [and]
inheritances ... were not in existence in 1787, it is impossible to state dogmati-
cally what the Founders and the ratifiers of the Constitution would have
thought of these taxes."'
' 72
A. Real and Personal Property as Appropriate Subjects for Taxation
The modem estate tax is grounded in the right to transfer property at
death. 1 73 Still, this tax falls primarily upon the transferred property itself. If a
person dies dispossessed of all property, then no estate tax will be levied
because there will be nothing to transfer. Without property, estate tax liability
ceases to exist. Therefore, in determining how the Founders would view the
estate tax, it must first be determined whether the Founders believed that real
and personal property were proper subjects for taxation.
The taxation of real property appears to be one of the primary subjects of
taxation contemplated by early Americans. The early requisitions that were
placed upon states under the Articles of Confederation were apportioned based
upon the real property contained within the state. 174 Alexander Hamilton wrote
that the nation's revenue needs "must fall with oppressive weight upon
land."' 175 Hamilton found a tax upon land to be one of the fairest forms of
taxation, as "[n]o tax can be laid on land which will not affect the proprietor of
millions of acres as well as the proprietor of a single acre."' 176 He took the
opposite view with regard to the taxation of personal property, describing per-
sonal property as being "too precarious and invisible" to levy taxes upon. 177
Despite Hamilton's praise of real property as an ideal source of revenue,
since the enacting of the Constitution, taxation of real property has primarily
been reserved to the states.178 Early American death taxes took a position
opposite to that of Hamilton, excluding real property, and falling entirely on
170 Madison, supra note 15.
171 Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 527 (1797).
172 SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION: ITS HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN DEMOC-
RACY 19 (1942).
173 Note, Taxation-Inheritance Tax-Deduction of Federal Inheritance Tax, 3 MINN. L.
REV. 137, 138 (1918).
174 THE FEDERALIST No. 12 (Alexander Hamilton).
175 id.
176 THE FEDERALIST No. 35 (Alexander Hamilton).
177 THE FEDERALIST No. 12 (Alexander Hamilton).
178 Jonathan Swain, The Taxation of Private Interests in Public Property: Toward a Unified
Theory of Property Taxation, 2000 UTAH L. REV., 421, 464 (2000).
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personal property. 17 9 Real property was not taxed under the death taxes of
1797, 1862 and 1898.180 Out of the early taxes, only the 1864 amendment to
the Civil War tax levied death taxes upon transfers of real property.'
8
'
Sources do not indicate whether the early non-inclusion of real property
was out of deference to the right of the states to tax real property or for another,
unspoken, reason. However, the consistency of the early taxes with respect to
real property provides evidence that personal property was deemed a more
appropriate subject for federal taxation than real property.
B. Transfers of Property at Death as an Appropriate Subject for Taxation
Taxes upon inheritances were first enacted in Great Britain through the
Harcourt Act in 1894.182 Sir William Harcourt, the sponsor of the Act,
believed that because the right to transfer property at death is something created
only by law, the state has first title upon the estate of a deceased, with benefi-
ciaries having subsequent and subordinate title.183 Harcourt viewed estate tax-
ation as being upon the "property," not upon the "person." 1 8 4 This is different
from the American view that estate taxation falls upon the transfer of property,
rather than the property itself. 8 5
However, with regard to the right to pass property after death, the United
States has traditionally viewed inheritance as a civil right, much like Har-
court. 8 6 "The right to take property by devise or descent is the creature of the
law, and not a natural right .... [I]t is the power to transmit, or the transmis-
sion from the dead to the living, on which such taxes [are based]."'1 87 Because
the fight to transfer property after death is granted only through law, the trans-
fer is more susceptible to taxation than if it were a natural right.
In the late 1700s, the civil laws of entail' 88 and primogeniture' 89 bestowed
upon children the right to inherit from their parents. Freedom of testation was
virtually non-existent, resulting in familial wealth being handed down from one
generation to the next, eventually leading to a concentration of both wealth and
179 Early wealth transfer taxes did not include real property in the tax base. See supra notes
39, 50-52, 72-73 and accompanying text.
180 Id.
"I1 Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, §§ 126-147, 13 Stat. 223, 287-91.
182 Hagerman, supra note 126, at 93. The U.S. estate tax enacted in 1916 is "clearly
modeled on the English Act." Note, The Federal Inheritance or Estate Tax, 2 VA. L. REG.
n.s. 702, 704 (1917).
183 Hagerman, supra note 126, at 93.
184 Id.
185 Ronald Chester, Inheritance in America Legal Thought, in INHERITANCE AND WEALTH
IN AMERICA, supra note 28, at 29-30.
186 ROBERT K. MILLER, JR. & STEPHEN J. MCNAMEE, INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN
AMERICA 9 (1998).
187 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1900).
188 Laws of entail worked to limit the inheritance of an estate to only the decedent's issue or
a class of issue. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 572 (8th ed. 2004).
189 Primogeniture is the common law right of the firstborn son to inherit his ancestor's
estate. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1230 (8th ed. 2004).
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power."19 Writing during Revolutionary times, Thomas Paine, one of the earli-
est American voices speaking against inherited wealth said,
To the evil of monarchy we have added that of hereditary succession; and as the first
is a degradation and lessening of ourselves, so the second, claimed as a matter of
right, is an insult and an imposition on posterity. For all men being originally equals,
no one by birth could have a right to set up his own family in perpetual preference to
all others for ever, and though himself might deserve some decent degree of honors
of his contemporaries, yet his descendants might be far too unworthy to inherit
them.
19 1
Likewise, Thomas Jefferson felt that inherited wealth created a dangerous
"artificial aristocracy, founded on wealth and birth, without either talent or vir-
tue."'1 92 During the first congressional session following the signing of the
Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson championed the elimination of
laws of entail and primogeniture. In Jefferson's view, the elimination of these
laws "removed the feudal and unnatural distinctions which made one member
of every family rich, and all the rest poor."' 93 Later, writing about the level of
equality found in the United States, Alexis de Tocqueville also saw freedom of
testation as a democratic equalizer. In Democracy in America, de Tocqueville
described the abolishment of entail and primogeniture as "the last step toward
equality."19 4 Further discussing the American inheritance laws, de Tocqueville
wrote, "As a result of the law of inheritance, the death of each owner brings
about a revolution in property; not only do his possessions change hands, but
their very nature is altered, since they are parceled into shares, which become
smaller and smaller at each division."'
195
Abolishing entail and primogeniture were steps toward the minimization
of inherited wealth. However, early steps were never taken toward the perma-
nent taxation of inheritances, even though such taxes had been suggested by
Thomas Paine. 196 In Agrarian Justice, Paine suggested that 10% of all inheri-
tances be placed into a common fund for public use.' 97 Every person, upon
turning twenty-one, would receive from this fund fifteen pounds of sterling as a
190 Stephanie A. Weber, Note, Rethinking the Estate Tax: Should Farmers Bear the Burden
of a Wealth Tax?, 9 ELDER L.J. 109, 115-17 (2001).
191 THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE, ch.2, § 10.
192 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in THE THOMAS JEFFER-
SON PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 1606-1827: SERIES 1 GENERAL CORRESPON-
DENCE, 1651-1827, available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/efferson-papers/
imagel257 (transcript of original used).
193 Thomas Jefferson, July 27, 1821, Autobiography Draft Fragment, January 6 through
July 27 (July 27 1821), in THE THOMAS JEFFERSON PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
1606-1827: SERIES I GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE, 1651-1827, available at http:/memory.
loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson-papers/ (transcript of original used). Jefferson also
fought for removal of the laws of entail and primogeniture because of their religious roots.
He felt that eliminating the laws would serve to further a separation of church and state. Id.
194 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, I DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA ch. 3 (1835), available at http://
xroads.virginia.edu/-HYPER/DETOC/tocindx.html.
195 Id.
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"natural inheritance." 198 Also, every person over the age of fifty would receive
ten pounds of sterling per year.' 99
Coincidentally, 1797, the year that Agrarian Justice was published, did
bring about the first U.S. death tax. However, the 1797 tax was enacted strictly
in an effort to generate revenue, not to create equality with regard to inherited
wealth.20 0 As evidence of this, immediately after Jefferson assumed office, the
tax on inheritances was repealed,2 ° ' despite Jefferson's strong stance against
inherited wealth. Jefferson's willingness, if not eagerness, to repeal the tax so
quickly indicates that while inheritances may have been an appropriate subject
for taxation in emergency situations, it was not viewed as an appropriate source
for permanent revenue. This position is supported by both the 1862 tax and the
1898 tax, both of which were repealed as soon as exigent circumstances ceased
to exist.212 Use of death taxation only in times of war is also consistent with
the terms of state ratification of the Constitution. 0 3
In summary, two patterns become apparent upon examination of the his-
torical death taxes. First, with the exception of the 1864 amendment to the
Civil War tax, real property was not historically included in death taxes, indi-
cating that it was not viewed as an appropriate subject for federal death taxa-
tion. Second, despite the fact that death taxes were proposed as a means by
which to eliminate some of the inequities associated with inheritance, death
taxation was not used for this purpose until 1916. Prior to 1916, death taxation
was used only as a way to raise revenue during times of war. The implication
of such selective use of the death taxation is that it was not viewed as an appro-
priate source of permanent revenue.
VI. WOULD THE FOUNDERS HAVE APPROVED OF PROGRESSIVE TAXES?
Is a progressive tax system consistent with the ideals of the Founding Gen-
eration? The modern estate tax, along with the federal income and gift taxes,
forms the basis of the progressive tax system found in the United States. 2"
Progressive taxes were not enacted at a federal level in the United States until
the Civil War, at which time both the North and the South enacted progressive
taxes.2 0 5 The progressive Civil War taxes were repealed at the end of the war,
and there was little public commentary regarding the appropriateness of pro-
gressive taxation until the 1880s. The 1880s were marked by an increase in
American fortunes, eventually leading to public cries for heavy taxation of the
rich.2 °6 Out of this process, a "soak the rich" tax policy emerged, 20 7 bringing
about the federal income and estate taxes.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 See Eisenstein, supra note 11 (arguing that the primary motivation behind historical
estate taxation is revenue generation).
201 PAUL, supra note 18, at 6.
202 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, §3, 16 Stat. 256; Act of Apr. 12, 1902, ch. 500, § 7, 32
Stat. 96, 97.
203 See supra note 140, and accompanying text.
204 PAUL, supra note 18, at 714.
205 Id. at 720.
206 Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 226.
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Progressivity has been identified as one of the "distinguishing characteris-
tics of American taxation." 208 However, the high taxation of the wealthy
seems contrary to the United States' "historical reluctance to erect governmen-
tal barriers to the individual 'pursuit of happiness.'"209
It is unlikely that the Founders, as a whole, envisioned a system of taxa-
tion in which the wealthy would bear a disproportionate burden with regard to
government funding. Rather, evidence from the time supports the position that
the majority of the Founders envisioned a proportionate system of taxation.
For instance, John Adams, a supporter of the aristocracy, wanted to "protect the
poor against excessive spoliation by the rich, and at the same time to defend the
rights of the rich against attacks by 'communistic levelers.' ' 2'  Alexander
Hamilton believed in a system of taxation in which each man was taxed in the
same manner, without the burden of taxation falling heavily upon any one
group."' Likewise, in 1776, economist Adam Smith wrote, "The subjects of
every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly
as possible in proportion to their respective abilities, that is in proportion to the
revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state."2 1 2
The premier early advocate for heavy taxation of the rich was Thomas
Jefferson.21 3 Speaking about early taxation, Jefferson wrote:
We are all the more reconciled to the tax on importations, because it falls exclusively
on the rich .... In fact, the poor man in this country who uses nothing but what is
made in his farm or family, or within the U.S., pays not a farthing of tax on the
general government .... [O]nce liberated by the discharge of the public debt ... the
farmer will see his government supported, his children educated, and the face of his
country made a paradise by the contributions of the rich alone.
2 14
However, Jefferson was seemingly alone in his viewpoint, and progressive
taxation did not appear permanently in the United States until 1913.215
By the 1940s, the number of advocates for a strong progressive tax system
had greatly increased in number.2 16 Beginning in the 1940s, economic histo-
207 W. Elliot Brownlee, Economic History and the Analysis of "Soaking the Rich" in 20th-
Century America, in THE ONGOING DEBATE: TAX JUSTICE 71, 71 (Joseph J. Thorndike &
Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002).
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 RATNER, supra note 172, at 29.
211 See supra notes 175-77, and accompanying text.
212 Richard A. Musgrave, Equity and the Case for Progressive Taxation, in THE ONGOING
DEBATE: TAX JUSTICE, supra note 207, at 9, 10 (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 185 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1904) (1776)).
213 RATNER, supra note 172, at 32-33.
214 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND PIERRE SAMUEL DU PONT DE
NEMOURS 1798 - 1817, 133-34 (Dumas Malone, ed. 1930).
215 Dennis J. Ventry, Equity versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in Historical Per-
spective, in THE ONGOING DEBATE: TAX JUSTICE, supra note 207, at 25, 3 1. Both a progres-
sive income tax and a progressive estate tax were used during the Civil War, but Congress
allowed the taxes to expire in 1872, following the conclusion of the war. Id. at 29. A
progressive income tax was enacted in 1894, but was overturned by the Supreme Court in
the case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). Ventry, supra, at
30.
216 Ventry says that by the early 1900s, Senator Robert LaFollette, Theodore Roosevelt, and
William Howard Taft all endorsed progressive income taxation. Id. at 31. In 1914, econo-
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rian Sidney Ratner promoted progressive taxation "as preeminently fit for
achieving and preserving the economic objectives of democracy. 21 7 On the
other hand, although Ratner was an advocate for progressive taxation, his writ-
ing provides support for the argument that early America fought for a propor-
tional tax system, rather than a progressive system. In 1942, Ratner wrote:
The historic struggle for control of the state by the middle classes in ... America
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was inspired to some degree by their
desire to secure a more equitable tax system, one in which they would not bear the
major tax burden without receiving commensurate benefits.2 18
The "benefit perspective" also appeared in Smith's model of taxation, in
which the benefits received from the government come in the form of protec-
tion given to the income. The income, in turn, results in an ability to pay, and
received benefits are valued according to that ability. 2 9 Because the benefits
received rise proportionally to the income earned, this model supports the idea
that the tax system should be proportional.
While progressive taxation serves as the cornerstone of modern American
taxation, it clearly developed during the early twentieth century, rather than
during the Founding era. However, the argument can be made that progressive
taxation falls within the founding ideals because it reconciles two competing
American principles: liberty and equality. 220 Through the redistribution of
wealth, progressive taxation works to ensure that all Americans have an equal
chance with regard to property rights, and other rights that derive from having
property.22 '
From the writings of the Founding Generation, it appears that the general
consensus was in favor of proportional taxation, rather than progressive taxa-
tion. Whether the gradual increase in both the size and number of great Ameri-
can fortunes would have caused the Founders to reevaluate progressive taxation
remains largely unknown.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Founding Fathers of the United States envisioned a country in which
freedom would be guaranteed and opportunity would abound. However, with
regard to the right to inherited wealth, the concepts of freedom and equal
opportunity are mutually exclusive. Freedom requires families to be permitted
to keep their wealth solely within the family, if they desire to do so. Even if
mist Roy Blakely wrote that "[t]he tendency in all countries and among both the theorists
and the masses, is strongly in the direction of graduated or progressive taxation." Id. In
both 1916 and 1918, the Wilson administration raised income tax rates. Id. at 32. By the
1940s, President Franklin Roosevelt suggested capping after-tax incomes at $25,000. Id. at
25.
217 RATNER, supra note 172, at 14.
218 Id. at 15.
219 Musgrave, supra note 212, at 10-11.
220 See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Choosing a Tax Rate Structure in the Face of Disagree-
ment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1697, 1734-37 (2005) (arguing that progressive taxation supports
liberty by enabling all Americans to have property rights while at the same time forging




great accumulations of familial wealth are detrimental to the democracy, free-
dom of testation requires that there be no governmental interference. In con-
trast, equal opportunity requires an equal playing field, and there cannot be an
equal playing field as long as some are born into wealth while others are born
into poverty.
The Founding Fathers found themselves in the unenviable position of hav-
ing to reconcile the competing interests of freedom and opportunity, as they
relate to inherited wealth. The abolition of entail and primogeniture were large
steps toward freedom, but only minor steps toward equalization of opportunity.
Equalization of opportunity would have required either heavy taxation of inher-
itances or a ban on inheritances, both of which would have cut drastically
against freedom. Therefore, the Founders took what little action they could-
they eliminated the laws that required inheritances to be passed solely along
family lines, and they taxed inheritances when there was a dire need for
revenue.
Had the Founders viewed inheritances as an appropriate source of perma-
nent revenue, we should have seen early, permanent, taxation of inheritances.
The enacting of a tax on inheritances in 1797,222 and proposed taxes in both
1794223 and 1796,224 provides evidence that the Founders recognized the con-
cept of inheritance taxation. However, the fact that the tax was repealed in
1802225 and was not reinstated again until 1862,226 despite revenue shortages
during the early 1800s,2 27 provides evidence that this mode of taxation was not
viewed as an appropriate source of permanent revenue.
Of course, as originally written and ratified, the Constitution allowed the
federal government to lay taxes in order to raise enough revenue to fund the
day-to-day operations of the government. 228 However, evidence indicates that
both the authors of the Constitution, and the states who ratified the Constitu-
tion, intended to use taxes upon commerce to provide the majority of govern-
ment funding; "direct taxes" were only to be used as a last resort in government
funding.
Another issue with the modern estate tax arises due to the inclusion of real
property. As discussed, historical federal death taxes did not generally include
real property in the tax base.22 9 Early documentation does not give a definitive
reason for the non-inclusion of real property in early taxes. However, it is
known that taxes upon land were generally reserved for state use,2 3° so the
inclusion of real property into the gross estate works against this early view of
states' rights.
222 Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 527 (1797).
223 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 39, at 277.
224 Id. at 409.
225 Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch.17, 2 Stat. 148.
226 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, 483.
227 The years leading up to the War of 1812, and the War itself, resulted in revenue
shortages. See supra note 45.
228 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
229 See supra Part V.A.
230 Madison, supra note 153.
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The progressive aspects of the modem estate tax are suspect only because
the Founding Generation did not, generally, support progressive taxation.231
Thomas Jefferson was one of the few Founders who openly advocated for pro-
gressive taxation.232 In contrast, proportional taxation enjoyed widespread sup-
port from the Founders. Considering that the Founders had just recently
escaped an aristocratic society, it would stand to reason that the Founders were
aware that an aristocracy could also develop in the United States. Still, the
majority of the Founding Generation supported a proportional taxation policy,
rather than a progressive taxation policy which would help to prevent the for-
mation of a New World aristocracy.
As stated at the outset of this Note, the difficulty in trying to ascertain
whether the Founders would have supported the modem estate tax is that it
requires applying eighteenth century ideals to the modem realities of the
twenty-first century. When forming opinions about the structure of a tax sys-
tem, and the limitations that should be imposed on such a system, the Founders
were not anticipating an annual federal budget in excess of $2.3 trillion.2 3 3 If
the Founders had been able to foresee the future, then there is a realistic chance
that their ideas and opinions regarding taxation would have been drastically
different. Regardless of the difference in time periods, if Congress is going to
stay true to the Founding Generation, the federal estate tax needs to be
reexamined.
In a first step toward a revamping of the federal estate tax, the transmittal
of real property should not be included in the taxable gross estate. By exclud-
ing real property, the modem estate tax would be a more accurate reflection of
historical wealth transfer taxes, and presumably, would be more in-line with
founding ideals. One of the chief criticisms of the modem estate tax is that it
causes the breakdown of family businesses and farms.2 34 The non-inclusion of
real property in the gross estate could serve to eliminate some of this criticism
as the real property associated with businesses and farms would no longer face
estate tax, decreasing the need to liquidate businesses and farms in order to pay
estate tax.
However, even if Congress was to eliminate the estate taxation of real
property, the fact still remains that historically, wealth transfer taxation was
used only to fund military operations and never for the everyday expenses of
the nation. Therefore, in order to remain true to founding ideals, Congress
should only utilize estate taxation to fund military operations. This can be
accomplished by earmarking all estate tax revenues to be used specifically in
defense spending. Since the enacting of the first U.S. wealth transfer tax in
1797,235 defense spending has always been an approved use of wealth transfer
taxation. Therefore, it can be presumed that the forefathers would continue to
view defense spending as an appropriate use of estate tax revenues.
In its current form, the modem estate tax does not conform to founding
ideals. By making two changes to the federal estate tax-excluding real prop-
231 See supra Part V.I.
232 See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
233 See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 112.
234 See Weber, supra note 190, at 118.
235 Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 527.
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erty and earmarking estate tax revenues for defense spending-Congress would
be able to save the federal estate tax while returning to the historical roots of
wealth transfer taxation. Such changes would result in a tax that would reflect
the historical foundation of wealth transfer taxation, embody the founding
vision, and help to meet modem revenue demands.
